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One of the frustrating things about philosophers is that they are often reluctant to give
simple answers to questions. You can ask what seems like a clear-cut yes-or-no question and get
a series of clarifications and distinctions that leaves the impression that you can answer the
question you asked only after you have addressed a half-dozen or so other questions. I want to
admit that philosophers do sometimes unnecessarily complicate things. But I would also suggest
that sometimes they are reluctant to give simple answers because these answers can be
misleading. My title question today is an example. If I am asked whether you need to be
religious in order to find meaning in life, I have some inclination to give a fairly simple answer:
No, of course not. But the reason that answer is likely to be misleading is that it’s not quite clear
what finding meaning in life amounts to. Sometimes when people reflect on the kind of meaning
that is available on a nonreligious understanding of things, they find it unsatisfactory. What they
are looking for when they seek meaning in life could only be found if some kind of religious
account is correct. So the question turns on what sort of meaning we are considering, and we
really do need to decide about that in order to know whether we are answering the question we
intend to ask. I’ll start with the kind of meaning that almost anyone can find.
I teach a course called “Ethics and Good Living”. At one point in the course I announce
to students that I will be telling them how to live a meaningful life. Since finding meaning in life
is usually thought of as something that most people should regard as valuable, I suggest to them
that this instruction will be worth the price of their tuition. Then I offer them a simple formula:

To live a meaningful life is to be fully involved much of the time in doing what you judge to be
most important.
I usually develop my formula a little by introducing some technical terminology. The
technical terms are engagement and reflection. To be engaged in an activity is to be fully
involved in it. You have probably had the experience of becoming engrossed in something that
captured your attention and focused your interest. It might have been something like climbing a
mountain or playing a computer game. Or it might have been something like meeting another
person you felt a kinship with and discovering the fascination of talking with that person for
hours. Contrast these kinds of experiences with cases in which you are doing something you
don’t really want to do or when you’re not giving full attention to what you are doing. We should
note that what you can become engaged in sometimes depends on whether you have developed
particular skills and knowledge. Someone who has devoted long hours and effort to becoming a
physicist might be capable of being engaged by a scientific research program that holds the
promise of discovering unknown truths about the universe, but someone without the skills and
knowledge wouldn’t be able to enter into such an activity. It’s also true that what you can
become fully involved in depends on what you care about. Some people are fascinated by
looking at antiques, whereas I have to be dragged into an antique store. What I mostly want to
emphasize here is that engagement is an important part of living a desirable life. If not much
really engages you, you’re like a spectator on your own life rather than a participant.
One kind of engagement is what one psychologist has called flow experiences. In flow
experiences people report a sense of effortlessness and loss of awareness of time and even
awareness of themselves. These experiences are different from what we typically think of as
experiencing pleasure. Yet people who have flow experiences tend to describe them as intensely

satisfying. Some kinds of athletic activities or musical performance can give rise to flow
experiences, but flow can also occur in tasks as varied as performing heart surgery or writing a
novel. Flow experiences could be thought of as cases in which engagement slips into high gear.
There’s an attunement between the doer and the act.
Besides engagement, the other technical term I am using is reflection. Here I am
referring to our capacity to stand back and think about what we are doing. So, for example, you
might think about how well or how badly you did when you gave a presentation or did a musical
performance. Or you might think about whether all the time you are spending going to class and
doing assignments is worth the effort. It’s often not a good idea to try to reflect on an activity
while you are doing it, and it would be unwise to try to reflect about everything you do. You
could drive yourself crazy. But there is also something undesirable about reflecting too little on
your activities. Imagine someone who decides to get married without considering carefully
whether doing so is a good idea. Or think of people who go through life doing the kinds of things
that others expect them to do without ever asking why. The kind of reflection that seems to me
most relevant to thinking about finding meaning in life involves what could be called judgments
of importance. We can stand back and look at our activities and judge some of what we do to be
relatively or even completely unimportant, but most of us also judge some things we do or might
do to be important or very important.
I need to be clear that when I speak of judgments importance, I am not talking merely
about whether something is important to you or beneficial from your individual point of view. If
it’s important for you to get a good education, it’s likely to be important in general that people
get a good education. If it’s important for you to be healthy, then it’s also important for other
people to be healthy. Thinking about what is important pushes us toward a wider perspective in

which our concerns to promote our individual interest have a place, but only in relation to a more
comprehensive understanding of what is valuable. One of the ways not to have a meaningful life
is to get caught up in narrowly self-interested concerns. Living meaningful lives involves caring
about things beyond ourselves.
You will recall that my original formula for living a meaningful life was to be fully
involved much of the time in what you judge most important. To bring in my technical terms,
living a meaningful life means bringing your capacities for engagement into harmony with your
reflective judgment about what is important to do. Now it doesn’t take much observation to
realize that your reflective self and your engaged self are not automatically in harmony. For most
of us, there is a major divergence between what we do and what we reflectively judge valuable
or worthy. It’s possible to spend endless hours doing what from your own point of view is a
waste of time, or if not a complete waste, something that should be deplored for squeezing out
things that are much more important. You might think that spending time talking to family
members is fairly high on your priority list, yet not spend much time doing it. Or you might think
that watching TV is not very valuable compared with other things that you might do, yet spend
lots of time in front of the television. Escapist activities or pleasant diversions can have a kind of
hypnotic effect that lulls you into habitually doing what your reflective self might judge lacking
in worth and what in some cases is not even satisfying. So it’s possible to realize that your life
lacks meaning because you are not focused enough on the kinds of things that seem to you to be
of highest value. To make your life more meaningful, you may need to become the kind of
person who cares about and is able to get caught up in activities you judge to be more important.
Even though I think that there is something to be learned from my simple formula about
living a meaningful life, I want to suggest that it’s too simple. One reason is that it doesn’t take

into account that we can be mistaken about what is valuable. You might think that something is
especially important because your thinking is short-sighted or you don’t understand what it
would be like to achieve some goal or you haven’t fully comprehended the effects on others.
Sometimes we change our minds about what is valuable. At one point something seemed allimportant, but after we have more experience or more knowledge, its value seems less.
Furthermore, sometimes we don’t change our minds, but if we had been thinking much at all, we
should have seen that what we were treating as very important is really less important than things
we are neglecting. So here’s the complication: suppose that you are engaged in doing things that
seem from your own point of view to be very important, but your judgment is defective. Let me
make this extreme by imagining that your great project in life is to create the master race and get
rid of everyone who is unfit. In other words you have Nazi values. So if you dedicate your life to
achieving your Nazi values, are you then living a meaningful life?
What this example shows, I think, is that my formula is really about living a life that is
subjectively meaningful. A life is subjectively meaningful when a person is significantly
engaged in activities that from her own reflective point of view seem most important, but
achieving subjective meaning is not necessarily enough to achieve objective meaning. The
person with Nazi values might be living a subjectively meaningful life, but because those values
are (to use the technical term) screwed up, the life is not objectively meaningful.
Making this kind of distinction seems to call for some account of how we can tell when
values have only subjective status and when they can be thought of as objectively established. I
am not going to address that question directly, except to say two things: First, most of us think
that there are good reasons to regard some judgments of value as mistaken, even if we are not
always be in a position to say authoritatively what judgments are objectively correct, or with

regard to some things, whether multiple and divergent claims might be equally correct. So the
closest we can get to achieving lives that are objectively meaningful may be to rely on our best
reflective judgment about what is important to do, but with the added admonition that our
reflection needs to be fully informed and should be open to correction. In other words our access
to objective meaning is through doing our best to purify our subjective conclusions about value.
My second observation is that our disagreements about what is important are sometimes
connected with disagreements about what might be called worldview issues. So, for example, if
one person understands the significance of our lives in relation to God and someone else thinks
that God does not exist, it’s likely that those differences will give rise to some differences in
judgments of what is most important and, hence, what would make life meaningful. So achieving
an objectively meaningful life might depend on finding a worldview that is closest to the truth,
but, to say the least, it’s notoriously difficult to know for sure that your worldview conclusions
are correct. Hence, you might be able to achieve an objectively meaningful life without knowing
for sure that you had done so, and you might live a life that is lacking in objective meaning
without recognizing it.
I will return later to the question of how differences about worldview issues are related to
differences with regard to the sort of meaning we might aspire to have. But for the moment,
rather than pursuing the admittedly interesting issue of subjectivity and objectivity in making
judgments of importance, I want to change the focus to a related but distinguishable concern.
Whether something is valuable or important seems to depend on the point of view from which
you are considering it. For example, when you get home tonight, it may seem important to you to
find something to cook for dinner. But suppose you think about cooking something for dinner
tonight in the context of thinking about your whole life. From that wider perspective, finding

something to cook for dinner on a particular evening seems much less important. In ten years
time what you had for dinner tonight or whether you skipped dinner altogether might seem
relatively insignificant, whereas if you did something today such as getting married or joining
the army, that decision might still seem very significant. So the question we need to ask about
the idea of becoming engaged in activities that you reflectively judge important is from what
perspective are the judgments of importance to be made.
To show how perspective can shape our judgments of importance, I want to use a
historical example of someone reflecting on whether his life is meaningful. The Russian novelist
Leo Tolstoy came to a point in his life in which he was plunged into despair by the thought that
his life was meaningless because there was nothing he could do that would achieve anything of
real worth. He describes his thought process in an autobiographical work entitled A Confession.
Tolstoy had been educated into the Christian faith as a child, but by the age of eighteen, he had
discarded any religious belief. He was fairly content with his life until his late forties, when
according to his own account he lost his motivation to do much of anything. In his own words,
My life came to a standstill. I could breathe, eat, drink and sleep and I could not
help breathing, eating, drinking and sleeping; but there was no life in me because
I had no desires whose gratification I would have deemed it reasonable to fulfill.
If I wanted something I knew in advance that whether or not I satisfied my desire
nothing would come of it.
What Tolstoy describes is a kind of reflective disengagement from his own life that undermined
his motivation to do much at all. It is as if he is going through the motions of living while his

reflective self casts a critical eye not only on what he is doing, but on anything he might do,
judging that nothing is worth doing. Tolstoy says,
If a magician had come and offered to grant my wishes I would not have known
what to say. If in my intoxicated moments I still had the habit of desire, in my
sober moments I knew that it was a delusion and that I wanted nothing. I did not
even wish to know the truth because I had guessed what it was. The truth was that
life was meaningless.
All of us know what it is to find some activity pointless. One of my favorite examples
comes from the experience of the soldier whose commanding officer tells him to dig a foxhole in
a certain location. Once the foxhole has been dug, the soldier is told to fill it back up. Then he’s
told to dig another foxhole, and, you guessed it, fill it up again. Such an activity contrasts with
cases where we are doing something in order to achieve a particular goal that seems to us worth
achieving. It is possible, however, to look at something that does not seem pointless and to ask
whether what we are aiming at really is worth achieving. You could think that working hard in a
particular course is important because you need to pass the course in order to graduate. But what
if you come to the point of wondering whether graduating is important or whether it will lead to
anything that you can regard as valuable? Then what seemed to have a point might come to look
pointless to you. When Tolstoy begins to consider various goals that might give meaning to his
activities, he becomes skeptical that achieving any of his goals amounts to anything significant.
Tolstoy’s judgment that life is meaningless because nothing he can do is important arises
when he looks at his life from the perspective of a kind of external observer who views it at
critical distance. Imagine, for example, someone writing a biography of Tolstoy at some point

after his death. From this external point of view, Tolstoy’s life occupies a particular period of
time. He lives, and then he dies. His accomplishments have various effects, but judging the
significance of his achievements will mean looking at them as items in a larger frame of
reference. Thinking about his own achievements from a very wide frame of reference, Tolstoy
says that when his life is over, “… nothing will remain other than stench and worms. Sooner or
later my deeds, whatever they have been, will be forgotten and will no longer exist.” This
thought leads him to wonder, “What is all the fuss about them?” That is, why do I put so much
time and effort into trying to do what from a wider perspective is insignificant.
In order to be engaged in what we are doing, we have to passionately care achieving
certain goals. In Tolstoy’s case the things that engaged him most were his writing and his family.
But when he considers his life as if he were an outside observer, he finds it hard to see his
concerns as worth all the passion. Whatever he might accomplish would ultimately be destroyed.
If he wrote great novels, they would in time be forgotten. If he cared for his family, they would
eventually be dead and gone. Furthermore, Tolstoy thinks that his conclusions about his own life
apply to everyone’s life, even if others are too unreflective to face the truth.
What is it about the relative impermanence of accomplishments that is so troubling for
Tolstoy? Well, let’s try a thought experiment about someone who devotes his life to achieving
something that lasts a relatively short time. Imagine a man who gets up every day and builds a
sandcastle on the beach. Imagine that he builds very elaborate sandcastles with moats and towers
and all sorts of interesting details. Each day when the tide comes in, that day’s castle is
destroyed, and each day the man goes back to build a new one. It’s not a stretch to imagine that
at some point the man might lose interest in continuing. He might reason that it is pointless to
spend so much time and effort on what will be destroyed before the day is over, and if he has

friends, they might well agree and encourage him to give up his sandcastle-building efforts and
find other pursuits.
Of course, even if it’s hard to sustain the kind of passion needed to continue when we
perceive our own achievements as ephemeral, there are obviously things in life with more
permanence than sand castles. However, how long-lasting something seems depends on the
perspective from which we consider it. Tolstoy’s writings may last for thousands of years, but if
one takes a long-enough view, it is possible to see in them the same lack of any enduring value
that caused our imagined sandcastle builder to lose heart. Whether they last for thousands or
even millions of years, they will eventually cease to be read or cease to exist. If we take a big
enough time span, they are like a small blip that is hardly noticeable.
Tolstoy has obviously set very high standards for the possibility of doing anything
worthwhile. Ordinarily we recognize the endurance of an achievement as having something to do
with its value, but we do not think that achievements must have effects that last forever in order
to be regarded as valuable. On the other hand, Tolstoy’s judgments do resemble comparative
judgment that we understand. Imagine comparing the accomplishments of the sand-castle builder
whose work lasts less than a day to the accomplishments of a cathedral builder whose work may
last thousands of years. From the ordinary human perspective, we might encourage the sandcastle builder to devote his talents to something of more lasting value, such as cathedral building.
Tolstoy takes a perspective from which all human activities, including cathedral building,
amount to very little. He looks at human activities from what we might call a cosmic perspective.
From this perspective the achievements of the cathedral builder seem just as transient as those of
the sand-castle builder look from the ordinary human point of view. From Tolstoy’s viewpoint,
the only satisfactory achievement would be something of eternal value.

One way of responding to Tolstoy is to suggest that he is setting the standards too high.
Tolstoy shows that it is possible to assume a point of view from which the significance of any of
our activities looks microscopically small. He does so by looking at his own life in the context of
a large time span. Others have suggested something similar by thinking about human life in
relation to the vastness of the universe. If you have ever gone to a planetarium and seen planet
earth as viewed from space and then seen the point of view shift to where earth is viewed in the
distance and eventually becomes indiscernible in a mass of galaxies, which themselves are small
in relation to the whole universe, you may have felt a similar sense of the insignificance of
human life. We live as inhabitants of one minor planet within a huge universe. What we do may
seem important to us, but in the larger scheme of things, it looks hardly noticeable.
But we might ask, even if there are points of view from which our activities seem
insignificant, should those judgments have the authority to cancel the recognition of value from
every other viewpoint. Even if caring for the needs of my children seems unimportant in the
cosmic scheme of things, it could still be something I judge to have real worth from a more
ordinary human point of view. From our ordinary human point of view, enjoying a sunset, or
memorizing a poem may be worthwhile things to do, whether or not they contribute to any farreaching ends. Developing a friendship or becoming a skilled counselor or composing a play
may be projects an individual can regard as worth a great deal of time and effort. So perhaps we
ought to take a more down-to-earth perspective, assessing value in relation to more realistic
expectations about what a human being could accomplish.
I think that there is merit in pointing out the divergence of Tolstoy’s judgments about
value from the judgments we make from a more ordinary human viewpoint. But I don’t think
that appealing to our ordinary judgments of value removes completely the kind of concern that

worried Tolstoy. To show why, let me use an example taken from the philosopher Richard
Taylor. Taylor has described the lives of members of a particular species of worms, inhabiting
the dark ceiling of a cave until it is transformed into a flying insect that will live only a day or
two. During that time, it mates, lays eggs, and then is caught up and devoured by the worms from
which it came. Now however we might imagine things seem to the worms, when we look at the
lives of these creatures, it is hard for us to see any meaning or significance. In fact, for many
people the dominant impression is one of a cyclic process that evokes a sense of futility or
pointlessness. If we could imagine these creatures being able to look at their lives as we do, then
they might despair of living.
But then imagine an external observer looking at the activities that engage members of
our species. Humans spend countless hours eating and mating and sleeping. They busy
themselves with various kinds of work, some of which contributes to fulfilling human needs and
some of which do not. They shop for clothes that they hope will continue to be in fashion. They
compose philosophical presentations. They do various things to impress each other. They
compose numerous text messages, sometimes to people in the same room. They travel long
distances. They get into conflict and fight. They raise children. They try to entertain themselves.
They get old and die. Is there something about all these activities that makes it seem as if
something of real importance is accomplished? Even if these individuals are passionately
engaged in what they do, when we look at their activities from a perspective that is not internal
to the species, our impressions may resemble the sense of pointlessness we have when we think
about the lives of those worms. Judging human lives meaningful seems to depend on accepting a
point of view structured by concerns that humans adopt easily enough, but that point of view

seems suspect when we think of human valuing as a product of human subjectivity that drops out
when we consider things in more objective terms.
The issue here arises because human beings have the capacity for looking at their lives
with varying degrees of subjectivity and objectivity, and they have urges to try to bring these
different viewpoints into some kind of unity. We can recognize cases in which a more objective
perspective shows the need to realign a more subjective perspective. For example, there are
things that matter to us from our individual point of view, but when we recognize that our point
of view is just one of many, we judge that it needs to be integrated with the more objective point
of view of what is good for our community or for members of our species. We can integrate the
more subjective with the more objective by assuming a moral point of view that recognizes the
legitimacy of what individuals want, but only within limits. However, the moral point of view
can also be seen as a product of human subjectivity. It is the way things seem to individuals who
are equipped with particular sensibilities that incline them to make judgments about things like
justice. So once we consider our moral judgments from a more objective point of view, can we
still recognize the more subjective assessments as carrying any authority?
Tolstoy exhibits a concern to unify his sense of what is objectively true with the
judgments of value that are needed to find meaning in life when he tries to think about human
value judgments in the light of the scientific picture of reality he accepts. Science, as Tolstoy
describes it, provides a picture of reality as material particles undergoing various changes in
space and time. A human being, on this account is in his words a “temporary, incidental
accumulation of particles.” Tolstoy takes this scientific picture to be the objective truth about
things, and his problem is trying to fit human aspirations to do things that are worthwhile with
this kind of picture. From the scientific point of view, these aspirations look like a kind of

accidental byproduct of a material system. If the material system is what is objectively real, it’s
difficult to think of the human sense of what matters as carrying much weight.
We could say that certain things matter to us, even if they don’t matter from the more
objective point of view described by science. However, we are creatures who understand
ourselves both from the point of view of the way things seem to us and from a more objective
point of view in which we are elements of a larger whole. We recognize the authority of the
wider perspective because our place in the bigger picture is part of our self-image. Furthermore,
we are used to overruling some subjective judgments that don’t sufficiently take into account the
wider point of view. When I judge some of my individual concerns as excessive, it is often
because I recognize I am only one person and the world does not revolve around me. So when I
think about the human species and the concerns that members of that species have, shouldn’t I
remind myself that the universe does not revolve around the concerns of my species? But in that
case, is it enough to say that some things matter to us? There is an urge to want to view our sense
of what is valuable as having a status greater than just preferences that are hard-wired into us.
What would it take to satisfy Tolstoy? I think it would take an account of what humans
might accomplish that could be recognized as valuable not only from the point of view of our
species, but from an objective point of view that transcends the human species, and which
represents what we take to be ultimately real. But when we put it that way, it is apparent that
what he is asking for is precisely the kind of thing that religious visions offer. Religious
traditions tell stories about some larger context within in which we are urged to understand our
lives and to view a certain kind of fulfillment as a way to achieve harmony with reality.

For example, in classical Hinduism the ultimate reality is called Brahman. At the deepest
level each of us is united with Brahman. However, we are stuck in a dreamlike reality that
obscures our true nature. When we give common sense descriptions or scientific descriptions, we
are dealing with the dreamlike realm of appearances, not what is real at the deepest level. Our
task is to come into harmony with the nature of things by discovering, not just intellectually, but
experientially, the truth about our nature and by structuring our lives in ways that allow us to
achieve liberation from our state of ignorance. Ordinary human concerns take on a different
significance when viewed in the light of this fundamental concern.
In Buddhism the ultimate truth of things is that the sense of a substantial self and a
substantial reality that we presume when we devote ourselves to satisfying our cravings is an
illusion. What we take to be the self is a temporary combination of elements that is constantly
changing, rather than anything permanent that persists through time. If we undertake the path
that will free us from the illusion of self, we can overcome the cravings that lead to suffering and
achieve a state of Nirvana, which puts us into harmony with the nature of things. To embark on
the path, we must learn the disciplines that allow us to put our ordinary concerns in proper
perspective.
In Abrahamic religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam human fulfillment is to
be found in relation to a supreme goodness called God. We can be properly related to this
supreme goodness, or we can resist and reject the claims of God on us. In the Christian version
the fulfillment called salvation involves changing our attitudes and developing our capacities to
love what is good, which includes becoming the kind of people who can genuinely love each
other. To embark on the path that leads to salvation is to become what we were intended to be

and achieve harmony with the love that underlies all things. Understanding our ordinary
concerns in the light of this supreme concern shapes our awareness of their relative importance.
Each of these religious traditions tells a story of what is ultimately real and ultimately
valuable, and the stories provide guidance about how to fit our lives into this larger frame of
reference. What makes life meaningful on such accounts is the possibility of achieving
something that can be recognized as valuable in relation to the most encompassing context.
Tolstoy came to the conclusion that it would take a religious story to give him the kind of
meaning he was seeking, and he thought that without this kind of meaning, he lacked sufficient
motivation to continue. Hence, he found himself reconsidering religious views he had previously
rejected. In the end he became convinced that a particular version of the Christian story was true,
and in coming to believe it, he was able to affirm a kind of meaning for his life that he judged
unattainable on any nonreligious view.
Someone who rejects any kind of religious story and takes science to reveal the ultimate
truth about things will very likely suggest that the kind of meaning Tolstoy was looking for is not
to be found. When we tell the ultimate truth about our place in the universe, we cannot fit our
concerns into a larger picture that reveals the possibility of some kind of transcendent
fulfillment. From the most objective point of view we can take about the universe, human
aspirations do not matter. Nevertheless, it might be claimed, we do not need an endorsement
from a larger context to give our lives meaning. We can find plenty of concerns that are
sufficiently worthy to engage us.
If we are convinced that no religious story is plausible, then it makes sense to adjust
whatever inclinations we have to be attracted by the kind of fulfillment that religious stories

describe and aspire only to the kind of meaning that a nonreligious understanding would allow.
But not everyone is in that position. Many people find religious accounts worth considering and
some find a particular religious account more believable than any alternative comprehensive
understanding of things. To such an individual, the kind of meaning available in a nonreligious
story may seem deficient by comparison. Once I think that a cosmic drama of redemption is
going on, having to settle for ends that are much less grand seems like a let-down.
Let me put the issue in a different way. It’s possible to describe activities in ways that
give them different kinds of significance. For example, you might do something that you
describe as “having sex” but in the right circumstances, it might also be described as “making
love”. Or you might describe what you are doing as “making marks on a page” but given the
right kind of circumstances, it might be “finishing my novel”. The meaningfulness or lack of
meaningfulness of an activity depends in many cases on what we conceive ourselves to be doing,
and finding greater meaning is often a matter of seeing how an activity fits within some larger
story which puts it in context. Furthermore, the grandest meanings generally are connected with
grand stories. Frodo’s actions in Lord of the Rings have the significance they do because he is
playing his role in a cosmic battle between the forces of good and evil.
Whether or not a particular way of describing our activities works can depend on what
stories are available to us. For example, Viktor Frankl tells of trying to help fellow prisoners in
Nazi concentration camps deal with their suffering by teaching them a way of thinking about
their suffering. He urged them to think of their suffering as a task that they had been given, rather
than viewing themselves as helpless victims. They could respond to their task, he suggested, by
giving in, or they could adopt attitudes that enabled them to preserve whatever human dignity
they could in a terrible situation. The question, said Frankl, is not what you expect of life, but

what life is expecting of you. The way of thinking that Frankl encourages fits easily into a certain
kind of religious story. It makes sense to think of life as a task if we can think of such a task as
being assigned to us by God and imagine that there is some good purpose to be achieved. But
suppose we don’t have an understanding of things that includes anything like God. Can we really
ask what life expects of us apart from personifying life in a questionable way? We could perhaps
ask what we expect of ourselves, but then the whole idea of assigning ourselves a task seems
odd, and the rhetorical force of the idea is lost. The point is that the ways of finding meaning that
are available to us depend on the kind of larger story we tell about the human situation, and some
kinds of meaning that fit in a religious worldview don’t fit in a nonreligious one.
All of this leads me to a reaction that some religious people have to secular versions of
how to find meaning in life. They find the account of meaning you can give on such stories a
little flat. It’s as if you thought you were on a quest to achieve some noble end and someone
comes along to inform you that what you thought was a quest is only a trip from point A to point
B. If that’s all you are doing, then you might be able to adjust to describing your life in a
different way, but having to make that adjustment involves the loss of a kind of meaning that
might well be connected with important motivations. Admittedly, Tolstoy’s conclusion that if
there is no religious meaning, there is no meaning at all seems like an overreaction. But perhaps
it is an understandable overreaction when we realize that some of the meanings we might have to
give up in renouncing any sort of religious view, involve the loss of understandings of human
life that an individual might regard as essential.
It might be said that the whole question of whether one finds a particular kind of meaning
hard to adjust to is largely irrelevant because we ought to be deciding about religious and
nonreligious stories on the basis of evidence. I’ve addressed this issue at great length in other

places and can only briefly outline my view here. What I would suggest is that the
comprehensive stories that we use to structure to our experience and orient us in life are not
decidable through making an evidential assessment from a neutral perspective. What convinces
us is something closer to trying on the outlook a particular story provides and finding that it
satisfies both our theoretical and practical concerns better than alternatives we are aware of. The
story that qualifies must fit with what we take to be the facts, but it also needs to engage us as
practical agents who seek the kind of life we can judge worthy. The fact that we desire a
particular kind of meaning is not by itself reason to adopt a religious account, but when a
particular kind of story makes meanings that connect with deep motivations intelligible, we have
a reason for seriously considering whether that story might be true.
So, do you have to be religious to find meaning in life? My inclination to say no
arises from the thought that if you accept a nonreligious view, you are likely to be able to find
some activities that you think sufficiently important to engage you. But that’s a big if. If you
have felt the appeal of a religious vision of things, then it may be that the kind of meaning that is
available only on a religious account will seem like something you cannot do without.

